| The U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) system is a | | | | and at sea. These Central European sites provide |
| single, integrated system to protect the United | | | | geographically ideal locations for protecting both the |
| States, its deployed forces, and U.S. allies and friends | | | | United States and our European allies. Allies in |
| against growing threats posed by ballistic missiles | | | | Southern Europe are not vulnerable to long-range |
| from rogue states such as North Korea and Iran. It is | | | | missile attack from Iran, but in a crisis, they would |
| the policy of the United States to work with its allies | | | | need the shorter-range defenses offered by Patriot |
| to deploy defenses against existing and emerging | | | | PAC-3s, Aegis BMD ships, Terminal High Altitude Area |
| threats from missiles of all ranges. | | | | Defense (THAAD) batteries, and other NATO missile |
| This is important because a ballistic missile carrying | | | | defense systems. The United States has concluded |
| just one weapon of mass destruction payload could | | | | negotiations with the Czech Republic and Poland. In |
| cause catastrophic damage to a country. The missile | | | | April 2008, all 26 NATO nations formally endorsed the |
| defense system deployed over the past four years | | | | missile defense plan, agreeing with the United States |
| protects the United States against long-range attack. | | | | that the threat from Iran is serious and that the Bush |
| It also integrates mobile sea-based and transportable | | | | Administration's planned defense approach is the right |
| land-based capabilities to intercept shorter-range | | | | one. The benefits of this deployment are clear. |
| missiles. In missile defense, geography matters. | | | | Long-range defenses in Europe will increase the |
| The early warning radars in Alaska, California, and the | | | | options available to U.S. leaders to defend against |
| United Kingdom and the long-range missiles based at | | | | sophisticated threats by providing more decision time |
| Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, | | | | and engagement opportunities. This deployment |
| California, are not positioned properly to defend | | | | would strengthen transatlantic security by reassuring |
| Europe against intermediate-range and long-range | | | | and defending allies and friends, complementing |
| ballistic missile attacks from Iran. The short-range | | | | emerging NATO plans to defeat short-range and |
| defenses (including Patriot systems) deployed by a | | | | medium-range threats, and preventing coercion and |
| handful of European allies and current U.S. sea-based | | | | preserving U.S. and NATO freedom of action. An |
| missile defenses cannot provide adequate defensive | | | | effective missile defense system could also dissuade |
| coverage and engage with high confidence the much | | | | rogue states from pursuing ballistic missiles in the first |
| faster missiles coming out of the Middle East. Iran is | | | | place and deter ballistic missile launches. Critics of the |
| in an aggressive race to build on its shorter-range | | | | European deployments worry about the predictable |
| missiles to extend its military reach. It is also acquiring | | | | negative reaction from Russia's leaders and the |
| missile technologies and even whole missile systems | | | | possibility of damage caused by debris. However, the |
| through trade with proliferators such as North Korea. | | | | 10 interceptors in Poland and the midcourse radar in |
| Iran has publicly announced that it is developing a | | | | the Czech Republic oriented toward the Middle East |
| space launch vehicle, which means developing the | | | | are incapable of intercepting the hundreds of |
| technologies and knowledge (e.g., rocket staging) for | | | | intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and the |
| longer-range ballistic missiles. | | | | thousands of warheads in the Russian arsenal. |
| These developments, combined with the statements | | | | Russian concern that the United States could turn |
| by Iran's leaders (e.g., Ahmadinejad's stated goal "to | | | | these defensive interceptors into offensive weapons |
| wipe Israel off the face of the map" and his | | | | is likewise groundless. Future U.S. activities at missile |
| admonition that other nations must "bow down | | | | defense sites in Europe will be transparent to the |
| before the greatness of the Iranian nation and | | | | Russians and to host nations. Perhaps more |
| surrender") are reasons for concern about Iran's | | | | important, this concern does not make military sense |
| military direction. One must ask why a country such | | | | from the U.S. point of view because the U.S. already |
| as Iran is acquiring ballistic missiles that can reach | | | | has the capability to bring offensive strike submarines |
| more than 1,500 kilometers, a strike range that would | | | | or bombers into a regional conflict. The United States |
| overfly Israel and the American bases in the region. | | | | has also assured its allies that the launched objects' |
| One possible answer is that Iran sees value in having | | | | momentum will cause debris resulting from intercepts |
| the ability to coerce and impose Iranian policy on | | | | in space to continue along the missiles' original |
| European leaders by holding them hostage. The | | | | trajectories and that most of this debris will burn up |
| power to blackmail and threaten European and U.S. | | | | when it reenters the atmosphere. |
| leaders means that Iran might not need to fire a | | | | Another way to view the debris question is to |
| single missile to affect the foreign and defense | | | | compare it to Europe's experiences during World War |
| policies of its enemies. | | | | II, when leaders found that shooting down enemy |
| An operational missile defense system that protects | | | | aircraft, regardless of where they crashed and the |
| European nations could counter any such move by | | | | level of damage caused by the crashes, made far |
| Tehran. Preparing defenses against an emerging | | | | more sense than allowing them to survive and deliver |
| missile threat takes many years, which is why the | | | | their bombs. |
| Bush Administration decided to proceed with | | | | One fact, however, is beyond dispute: Once a missile |
| deploying 10 long-range interceptors in Poland and | | | | has been launched and its payload has acquired the |
| building a midcourse discrimination radar in the Czech | | | | target, our leaders and the leaders of Europe will |
| Republic. | | | | have only the option of missile defense to secure the |
| The missiles and the radar would provide redundant | | | | safety of the citizens of their countries. Find out |
| protection of the United States and an initial defense | | | | more about the growing nuclear proliferation threat |
| of Central and Northern Europe from long-range | | | | facing the world today. Visit 33 Minutes - Missile |
| ballistic missile attack. The radar in Central Europe | | | | Defense in a New Missile Age, a new documentary |
| would supplement sensor coverage from the early | | | | film about missile defense in America. The site |
| warning radar in the United Kingdom, which is already | | | | includes video commentary, animations of missile |
| integrated into the U.S. system, and other radars that | | | | defense strategies, and extended missile defense |
| might be deployed in and around the region on land | | | | resources and articles. |